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SOME NEW IDEAS ABOUT LAW
By ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,

JL.*

Our discussion of something new will begin with the year
1345. In a complicated litigation over church property, one
of the lawyers argued to the judges, "I think you will do as
others have done in the same case, or else we do not know
what the law is." "It is the will of the judges," replied Judge
Hilary, but Chief Justice Stonore broke in, "No, law is that
which is right." Thus these old lawyers and judges made
clear-cut the issue which still vexes us. Do judges make law,
or do they merely discover the rules of justice which already
exist somewhere or other?
According to one view, the law is like a great continent
which the judges are gradually mapping out by their decisions.
A wrong decision is simply a mistaken line in the map which
can be rubbed out and the right line substituted. According to
the view that judges make law, we can think of legal doctrines
as like the beams of a skyscraper which the judges are gradually putting in place. If they set a beam wrong, they can take
it down and lay it differently, but while it is up that beam is
part of the skyscraper.
Or I can compare the judge to a slot machine into which the
legal rules (either statutes or rules declared by previous
judges) are dropped and out comes the decision. According
to this theory, the main occupation of the judges is to discover the pertinent rules. They may be contained in statutes,
which makes this task easy. If they are only to be found in
prior judicial decisions, it is a somewhat harder job. Yet it is
believed that a trained man, by studying a judicial opinion, can
state with certainty the principle which guided the judge. If
the student of the opinion is himself a judge, he can apply this
principle to the facts in a new case before him. Similarly, a
lawyer can use the same principle to advise a client how he
SAddress by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School, delivered before the Indiana State Bar Association at Lake Wawasee,
Indiana, July 10, 1936.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

should transact his affairs, because future judges will find the
same principle in the old case and apply it if a dispute should
arise. Thus we have a theory of certain rules existing outside
the minds of individual judges and discoverable by judges and
lawyers.
This comfortable theory has become rather shaky during
the last few years. Let us begin by examining the assumption
that a rule can be discovered with certainty in a prior decision.
For example, take the important decision of the United States
Supreme Court in 1918, InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215. The Associated Press was obtaining the latest news from the war front in France and
delivering this news to its member newspapers. Hearst was
on bad terms with France so that the correspondents of the
Hearst newspapers were prevented from getting war news
directly. The agents of the Hearst News Service adopted the
ingenious practice of copying war news from "thebulletin boards
and early editions of the Associated Press newspapers and telegraphing these items to the Hearst papers. Because of the
convenient revolution of the earth, these telegrams reached
the Pacific Coast several hours before the time they were dispatched from the Atlantic Coast and California Hearst newspapers would often get this war news on the streets before the
Associated Press newspapers appeared. The Associated Press
sued to enjoin the Hearst Agency from continuing this practice. The news was not protected by copyright. There was
no pertinent statute and no prior decision close to the facts.
The Supreme Court granted the injunction with a long, serious
opinion. What single sure principle can be drawn from this
decision to guide a judge in deciding a later case, or a lawyer
in advising a client? The more we study the opinions in this
case the more we see that the actual litigation was like a stone
thrown into the water and sending out a series of concentric
circles. What the Court actually did was to hold the Hearst
Service to be subject to disagreeable physical consequences if
it persisted in its conduct. Yet the decision must mean more
than that this particular defendant can be coerced by this
particular plaintiff. Going outward from the stone, we reach
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the first circle and can say that the decision means that one
news gathering agency cannot imitate the news gathered by a
rival agency while that news is fresh. Or we can go out to a
second circle and say that news while fresh is protected from
appropriation for gainful purposes by another person, whether
this other person is a rival news agency or something else, for
example, a radio broadcasting station. Or we can go out to a
third circle, and find abundant support in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Pitney for the principle that a person cannot reap
where he has not sown and cannot gather in the product of
another's labor at the very point where the profit is to be
harvested. This principle would apply whether the subject
matter misappropriated is news or something very different.
Indeed we can make an even wider sweep and find in the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney the principle that "when the rights
or privileges of one are liable to conflict with those of another,
each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not
unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of the other." Which
of these four principles is the rule discovered by the Supreme
Court in the Associated Press case? Perhaps we shall be
helped in answering this question by observing some later
judges engaged in the process of discovery.
In a recent case in the United States court in New York
City, the facts were these. Cheney Brothers, the well known
silk manufacturers, got out each season new patterns of silks
for neckties, scarves, etc. These patterns were designed at
great expense. Some of them proved attractive to the public
and others did not. The Doris Silk Corporation, without
bothering about hiring designers of its own, was in the habit
of watching the Cheney patterns on the counters of stores and
after noticing which patterns sold well the Doris Company
would imitate these successful patterns in its neckties and
scarves. The Cheney Company sued for an injunction. Such
an injunction should clearly have issued if the rule declared by
the Associated Press case was that a person cannot reap where
he has not sown. However, Judge Learned Hand refused the
injunction and said that the Associated Press decision applied
only to news. What rule then does it declare for news? In two
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recent cases a radio broadcasting station was picking up recent
news items from the evening editions of Associated Press
newspapers and sending them over the air to the listeners.
The United States court in South Dakota stopped the broadcasting station, finding in the old case the rule that news could
not be imitated for gain while it was fresh. Subsequently
another United States court in Washington refused to enjoin
another radio station, finding no rule in the old case that was
applicable since the plaintiff sold its news and the broadcasting
station distributed its news gratuitously, 44 Yale L. 1. 879.
Thus the judge in a later case appears to be free to choose the
particular radiating ripple in the old case at which he will
start.
Statutes enacted by a legislature might seem to leave no
opportunity for a judge to make law. This is true so long as
the particular case is exactly covered by the language of the
statute. However, this does not always happen. A public
land statute of Congress granted land to settlers, a quarter
section (160 acres) to "a single man" and a half section (320
acres) to "a married man." A widow settled on some public
land. Was she outside the generosity of the government or
was she a "single man" or a "married man?" The Land Office
refused to give her anything. The Supreme Court held that a
widow was a "single man," saying that this was "the intent of
the framers" of the statute. Silver v. Ladd (1868), 7 Wall.
219. They did not find this intention by consulting the men
who had been in Congress when the statute was passed. The
judges merely looked at the whole statute and found out for
themselves what it fairly ought to mean. In large measure
the intent was the intent of the judges.
Another federal statute, the Contract Labor Law, made it
a crime to prepay the transportation of any foreigner into the
United States under contract "to perform labor or services"
in the United States. It was passed because railroads and
other large corporations had been sending agents to Europe
to hire gangs of laborers to come over and work at low wages.
Trinity Church brought in an English clergyman as its rector
and was prosecuted for bringing a foreigner in under contract
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"to perform services." Nevertheless, the church was held not
to be within the statute. The Court said, "We cannot think
Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction
like that." Although the Court went on to say expressly,
"This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of
the legislator," the judges had no testimony about the intention of the legislators but simply drew their own inferences
from the wording of the statute and the evil it was passed to
meet. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (1892),
143 U. S. 457.
The White Slave Traffic Act was also aimed at a specific
evil. It made it a crime to transport a woman in interstate
commerce for prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral purpose. The defendant and a young woman went
from California to Nevada to spend a week-end together.
Although there was no commercialized vice involved, this was
held to be within the statute. The Court said, "Congress had
in view-Congress evidently thought," without really knowing
what members of Congress thought. Once more the judges
expanded the statute by supplementary legislation of their
own. This was not improper. They could do nothing else,
although they need not have made the law they did. Caminetti v. United States (1917), 242 U. S. 470.
A personal experience illustrates the fictitious nature of the
legislative intent. Some years ago the Rhode Island Bar
Association submitted a bill to the legislature improving the
way in which the property of a dead person should be divided
if he left no will. As secretary of one of the bar association
committees, I did most of the detailed work of drawing this
bill. It was enacted by the General Assembly without substantial change. Afterwards litigation arose as to what provision of this statute covered a rather unusual kind of property. The statute said nothing expressly on the point. If the
hole in the statute was to be filled up according to the intention
of the men who drew the act, whose intention should it be?
The members of the legislature had kindly accepted the recommendation of the bar association, and the members of the bar
association had trustingly accepted my recommendation. If
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anybody's mind was concerned it was my own. The truth was,
of course, that neither the members of the legislature nor I
had thought for a minute about this particular question. The
lawyers in the case wrote to ask how I thought the point was
covered by the statute and I gave them my view. The lawyers
tried to read my letter to the court and the court very properly
refused to pay any attention to it, although the decision in fact
corresponded to my view. In reality the judges formed their
own opinion of how the hole in the statute ought to be filled
and did not care about the intention of the only person who
had done any detailed thinking in the matter. Thus statutory
rule was treated in the same way as judge-made rules. The
court has a choice between various possibilities.
So in the interpretation of a constitution, the court does not
merely declare the pre-existing will of the people, because the
people probably never thought about the matter one way or the
other when they voted for the constitution. "The process of
adopting a constitution," Professor Morris Cohen, of the College of the City of New York, says "is frequently spoken of as
if it were a magical or supernatural procedure. It is, however,
subject to all the frailties of human nature." There is no
sharp distinction between the capricious will of the people as
shown in the election of legislators and the deliberate, solemn
will of the people as embodied in constitutions. In fact, statistics show that the people take much less interest in constitutional provisions than in candidates. How many of those who
vote for approval have taken the trouble or have the opportunity to consider carefully all the possible consequences of
every provision. It is absurd to suppose that when the reconstruction Congresses forced through the Fourteenth Amendment at the point of the bayonet to protect negroes, the people
actually intended that states could fix the rates of fire insurance
companies but could not fix the amounts that New York
theatre ticket agencies would add to the box-office prices. The
Supreme Court made the law on those questions when they
construed the general words "due process of law."
This does not mean that the judges are completely free to
declare any rules of law they wish, though we shall find some
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writers so suggesting. Judicial law-making is limited by the
rules of the process and the nature of the material. It attempts to accomplish three purposes, namely: (1) To decide
the dispute between the parties, (2) To bring the case within
a general rule, logically related to some prior rule or rules
(this is questioned) and (3) To have general rule adapted
to future disputes.
But legislative law-making is also limited though less closely
and by different factors. Careful studies of legislation like
Dicey's Law and Public Opinion show that so far as it does
change the substantive law it is not entirely arbitrary but does
move somehow according to definite directions. The fate of
the Volstead Act shows that legislation may fail when it goes
too far. It is not correct to suppose that the work ,of the
legislature is entierly independent of prior law and custom
while the work of the courts is entirely predetermined. Both
make law in ways conditioned by their methods and materials.
Rules as to rights are often not found in statutes or other
pre-existing sources. The judge states a new rule to explain
what he is doing in the particular case as if that rule had always existed. Along come Professor Llewellyn and his
associates to suggest that this rule may be of little or no importance. These "Realists," as they call themselves, insist
that we concentrate on what the judge and jury do, and not on
what the judge says. "A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext
Step," 30 Col. L. Rev. 431 (1930).
We like to say, and the judges encourage us, that a person
has "a right to the performance of a contract." What really
happens, Llewellyn points out, is this.
"If the other party does not perform as agreed, you can
sue, and if you have a fair lawyer, and nothing goes wrong
with your witnesses or the jury, and you give up four or five
days of time and some ten to thirty per cent of the proceeds,
and wait two to twenty months, you will probably get a judgment for a sum considerably less than what the performance
would have been worth-which if the other party is solvent
and has not secreted his assets, you can in further due course
collect six per cent interest for delay."
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Lawyers do not like to talk like this when they discuss the
nature of law. Instead of the remedy, which you can see, they
prefer to talk of the substantive right, which you cannot see
but which you know is there, somewhere-people tell you so.
It is pleasant to get into the ultimate concepts behind what
courts do. You can think more clearly in this world of ideas.
It is not so much obscured by inconsistency and confusing facts.
"Right" gives a specious appearance of substance to rules;
they seem to be about some thing.
Llewellyn wants to shift the focal point of legal discussion
from abstract rights and rules to the area of contact between
the behavior of judges and the behavior of laymen. The traditional approach is in terms of words. It tacitly assumes
that words reflect acts and influence acts effectively to make
them conform to the rule, e. g., the defendant is liable to perform such and such a contract. He admits the accepted rules
do sometimes influence the actual behavior of judges, but
sometimes the rules and the practice diverge. "How, and
how much, in each case." You cannot generalize on this,
without investigation. He wants to learn the actual doings
of judges and the. actual effects of their doings, to compare
facts with facts and not words with words. He wants to
find how far the paper rule (what the judges say) is mere
paper and how far real, that is, how far the judges do what
the rule tells them to do.
Now we take a very significant step. Most legal discussion centers around the work of appellate courts, whose sayings about rules are readily accessible in official volumes. But
if we want to know law-in-action, we must go beyond these
upper courts and see how far the rules are followed by the
acts of lower court judges. Any disobedience of the rules
on their part will perhaps be corrected by the higher court if
any appeal is taken, but in the mass of decisions by lower
judges there is no appeal. Yet the acts of the judges in the
Sixth District Court have far more effect on the lives of
Providence citizens than those of the Supreme Court judges
in the bigger court-house to the south. It often happens that
these so-called "inferior" courts act as they desire regardless
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of the paper rules issued from on high. Thus the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has repeatedly laid down the
rule that injunctions are not granted unless some property
right is to be protected. Newspaper clippings collected by me
tell how one lower Massachusetts judge enjoined Mrs. Tillie
Feldman from making any rude or improper faces at her
neighbor, Mrs. Minnie Freedman, and how another lower
judge enjoined all love affairs between William Beach, of
Springfield, and a Mrs. Thompson, whom the judge ordered
to go back with her husband to Indianapolis and forget all
about Beach. These lower court judges are forbidding interference with the plaintiff's peace of mind though no money
is at stake. Which is the law of Massachusetts? Llewellyn
says not the paper rule but what the judges did to the maker
of faces and the erring wife.
Then he goes still further. What influence do the rules
have on other officials than judges-sheriffs, policemen, immigration inspectors? Laymen see much more of these officials than of judges. To many a man they are the law. The
decision of the official might be set aside by a court, but it
never gets to a court. The decision of the $1800 clerk in
Bureau B that traveling expenses to attend a summer session
are not deductible from my professor's salary is the law in
my case, whatever judges have said to the contrary.
It may well be that the discrepancy is very great between
what the statutory or judge-made rule tells an official to do
and what the official actually does. Thus the constitution of
Illinois says: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to give evidence against himself." The Illinois statutes
make it a serious crime for two or more persons to commit an
assault upon another for the purpose of obtaining a confession or revelation tending to incriminate the man assaulted or
anybody else. The frequent behavior of the Chicago police,
as described by judges of the State Supreme Court, is to question the arrested man for several hours without food or sleep
and then take him to "see the goldfish" which involves being
dragged around by the hair and beaten with a length of rubber
hose. Which is the law of Illinois? Llewellyn says what the
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policemen do. "What these officials do about disputes is, to
my mind, the law itself."
The last discrepancy he would bring into the limelight is
that between the rules and the behavior of laymen. How far
do they do what the rules tell them? I think we lawyers assume too easily that laymen, even intelligent business men,
guide their conduct according to judicial decisions, or at least
statutes. For 250 years England and every state has had a
statute making oral guarantees of another man's debt invalid,
yet much money is lent and work done on the faith of unwritten guarantees without apparent knowledge of the statute.
In some states if A buys land with money furnished by B under
an oral agreement that A will give B a deed when B asks for
it, B can enforce the promise; in other states these oral trusts
are expressly forbidden by statutes. Yet people seem to go on
making them just as freely, in the second region as in the
first, if the mass of litigation is any test. Obviously, both
legislatures and courts will make rules more wisely, the more
they know about their probable effect on human conduct. For
them law is not a collection of abstract rules but the totality
of social behavior, or, at least, official behavior. The influence of a recent school of psychology is plain, but to some extent, this theory goes back to a remark by Mr. Justice Holmes
in 1897: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
Critics have pointed out that the context shows that Holmes
was describing law from the viewpoint of the layman, and
that his definition is of no help to the judge trying to oecide
a case. Similarly, the definition, "Medicine is what the doctor
gives you," might satisfy a patient, but not a physician hesitating what drug to give him.
As Pound has pointed out, law like "droit" and "recht" is a
very ambiguous word. Llewellyn uses it in one sense, to mean
the judicial or official process and the outcome of that process. It can also mean a collection of rules, of grounds for or
guides to judicial and administrative action. We do not have
to stop saying the law forbids murder because some murderers
are not arrested or convicted. Both subjects are worthy of
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study, whether we call them by the same name or not. One is
a body of "oughts" and the other a body of "ises." Llewellyn's
main service is in insisting on the temporary divorce of "is"
from "ought" for purposes of study and the immense need of
realizing the discrepancies between the two.
Even if one does not agree with the Realists, the preceding
discussion shows the importance of human beings in the formulation of legal rules. Just as Graham Wallas and Harold
Laski have brought into political science consideration of the
selection, training and thinking of government officials, so
legal writers have given increased attention to the mental
processes of judges. It is like the shift in philosophy from
cosmology to epistemology.
The attitude of the advance guard to this problem of judicial thinking has been chiefly influenced by one school of psychology, behaviorism, the doctrines of which have been credited with the infallibility simultaneously denied by the Realists
to rules of law. Perhaps you have been wondering that I have
not said anything about an even more famous psychologist. In
1928, my colleague Austin W. Scott, after outlining some wild
ideas about law, remarked:
"I thank God that the theories of Freud, which in many quarters
were accepted as ultimate psychological truths, were propounded sufficiently long ago, so that their universal validity was generally denied
before the teachers of law discovered them. I, for one, would be sorry
to be compelled before determining how a question in the law of trust
will be decided, to investigate the love life of the judges who are to
make the decision. When Lord Eldon's house caught fire one night, he
buried the great seal in his back yard, and Lord Campbell tells us that
he became so much absorbed in watching the maids running about in
their shifts that he completely forgot where he had buried it. But I
doubt whether there is any close connection between this event and
one of his important decisions."

Professor Scott's jubilation over the legal repression of
Freud was premature. Within two years Mr. Jermome Frank
published his Law and the Modern Mind, which explains the
craving for certainty in law by the desire to regain the uninterrupted serenity we enjoyed in the womb. The child at
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birth, he tells us, is literally forced from a small world of almost complete and effortless security into a new environment
which at once sets up a series of demands. The baby finds
himself in what William James called "a big, booming confusion." He longs to find once more peace, comfort, protection from the dangers of the unknown. At first the child
satisfies that craving through his confidence in his omnipotent,
infallible father. Then repeated experiences erode this fictional over-estimate.
There are many things his father
doesn't know and cannot do. Despite advancing years the
childish fear of change remains and a growing man attempts
to satisfy his longing for serenity through the rediscovery of
father, through father substitutes.
The Law, a body of rules apparently devised for infallibly
determining what is right and what is wrong takes the place
of the omnipotent father. Grown men, when they strive to
recapture the emotional satisfactions of the pre-natal or childish world, seek in their legal systems the authoritativeness,
certainty, and predictability which they once believed they had
found in the law laid down by their father. Hence arises the
basic legal myth that law is, or can be, made unwavering, fixed,
and settled.
On the basis of Piaget's Studies in Child Psychology, Mr.
Frank gives us other parallels between lawyers and children.
Children are egocentric, wishful thinkers, and believe in word
magic. The name is the thing, for lawyers as for Plato, who
also had a childish mind.
In reality there is no certainty about law, the judges merely
decide as they want. Why then all these volumes of law
reports, full of long judicial opinions? If only what the
judges do is important, why do they say anything? Merely
because they are in a conspiracy to preserve the Freudian
myth of certainty. A former president of the American Bar
Association advised Mr. Frank at the bcginning of his practice, "The way to win a case is to make the judge want to
decide in your favor and then, and then only, cite precedents
which will justify such a determination. You will find plenty
of cases to cite in your favor." Mr. Frank also quotes a
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federal judge, Hutcheson, who has let the cat out of the bag
in an article entitled, The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decisions, 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 274. Judge Hutcheson
says that the judge really decides by feeling and not by judgment, by hunching and not by reasoning, the ratiocination appearing only in the opinion. After the astute judge has made
up his mind how he will decide on the basis of an intuitive
sense of what is right or wrong in the case, he enlists his every
faculty and belabors his laggard mind, not only to justify his
intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster with his critics.
In other words, the judge is just kidding himself and others by
his opinion. The pretense of certainty is desirable to make men
obey, just as Plato advocated that the rulers of his Republic
would find considerable doses of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects; but no certainty is really
there, none is possible, none is even desirable, for it would prevent any change. Mr. Frank closes his book with the hope
that lawyers and judges may, like Mr. Justice Holmes, acquire
a completely adult mind and win free of the myth of fixed and
authoritarian law. Skepticism has proved its worth in the
physical sciences. It has yet to do so in the law.
Mr. Frank's book has two aspects, his psychoanalysis and
his doctrine of uncertainty. The psychoanalysis opens unsuspected chasms before us. He tells us that the judge in learning the facts that are the basis of his hunch is continually
subject to minute and distinctly personal biases. "His own
past may have created plus or minus reactions to women, or
blonde women, or men with beards, or Southerners, or Italians,
or Englishmen, or plumbers, or ministers, or college graduates, or Democrats . . The peculiar traits, dispositions,
biases and habits of the particular judge will, then, often determine what he decides to be the law." So when I once went
with Horace Kallen to hear Judge Webster Thayer decide a
motion for a new trial for Sacco and Vanzetti on the ground
that the jury had got the bullets mixed up, Kallan took one look
at Judge Thayer as he sat down in the courtroom and remarked
"That man has something in his past that he is ashamed of
and wants to conceal." I am not equipped to determine the
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validity of Mr. Frank's psychoanalytic theory and must leave
it to Professor Carmichael. Mr. Mortimer Adler turns the
tables by suggesting that Mr. Frank and his Realist friends
are themselves the victims of an inferiority complex. Although they make fun of the awe-struck voices with which
lawyers mention Marshall, Kent, Story, and Shaw, they are
continually citing impressive names like Freud, Piaget, Dewey,
Vaihingar, Malinowski, and C. I. Lewis with implicit confidence. Instead of law they worship scientific method. Their
myth is that empirical science portrays the real world.
As to Mr. Frank's other point, that there is no logic about
judicial opinions and judges always decide as they want to, we
have first-hand testimony from soberer judges than Hutcheson. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in his Nature of the Judicial Process (1922), frankly admits that a judge has a choice in developing rules of law, but refuses to deny the existence of
genuine rules. He carefully analyzes the factors which have
determined his past choices, naming four of these factors:
Analogies along the line of logical progression, historical considerations, the customs of the community, such as business
practices in a commercial case, and considerations of justice,
morals, and social welfare, which he calls the method of
sociology. Mr. Justice Cardozo's work lay largely in appellate courts, but the experience of a trial judge is ably described
by Judge Ulman of Maryland in J Judge Takes the Stand
(1923). He kept a diary of his trials, and whenever the jury
went out to deliberate he put down what he himself would vote
if he were on the jury. Against this he recorded the actual
verdict of the jury in the case, and then if this verdict differed
from his own view he wrote out what he believed to be the
reasons for the divergence. On one occasion Judge Ulman,
sitting without a jury, had to pass on the validity of an order
of the Maryland Public Service Commission reducing the fares
charged by the Baltimore street railways. The main issue
involved the amount of a proper depreciation reserve. Since
he was much influenced by the dissenting opinions of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, he wanted to decide against the railway company and hold that the fares were properly lowered by the
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Public Service Commission. Nevertheless, his study of the
previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court made
him feel obliged to decide in favor of the railroad and write
an opinion to that effect. Judge Ulman's decision was sustained by the United States Supreme Court, with a dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
These judges bring out the point that among the factors
which determine what a judge does are his professional training and experience. His choice among the competing analogies offered by previous decisions and other sources is not
completely arbitrary. Opposing legal principles do not fit the
same set of facts with the same degree of appropriateness.
Thorough consideration of both principles is likely to show a
difference in their respective consequences to society or in their
logical relations to the general body of law. Hard thinking
of this sort affects the judge's final conclusion as much as his
initial hunch.
Certainly it is bettei to examine analytical rules critically
than to act only on intuitive hunches, which are often just a
body of prejudices, illusions, and ancient metaphysics. In so
far as trained and open-minded judges do have such hunches,
we cannot assume that the so-called intuition is irrational even
when its sources are unconscious. Into the hunch may go a
great deal of previous thinking that is not specifically remembered. A fruitful illustration is furnished by The Road to
Xanadu. Just as Coleridge unconsciously fused in the passage
thoughts drawn from his reading of many different books,
doubtless without specific recollections of his sources, so a
judge's long experience in his law library and on the bench
may unconsciously supply the elements which produce the rapid
feeling that the plaintiff ought to recover or ought to lose.
Another outside influence upon law comes from the physical
sciences. The effects are not entirely harmonious. Mr. Frank
uses them to support his theory of legal uncertainty. "The
physicists . . . have just announced the Principle of Indeterminacy. If there can be nothing like complete definiteness
in the natural sciences, it is surely absurd to realize even an
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approximate certainty and predictability in law, dealing as it
does with the vagaries of complicated human adjustments."
On the other hand, Walter Wheeler Cook is fully aware
of the human tendency to uniformity of action, which Mr.
Frank ignores. Cook has taught mathematics for four years,
and really knows something about scientific method. Also he
is a legal scholar of the first rank. For him the physical
sciences are a guide for new approaches to law, and not a
solution of all our troubles. The laws of nature are no longer
assumed to be immutable truths, he says, in combating absolutist legal conceptions. The laws of nature are reached by
collecting data, that is, by observing concrete phenomena, and
then forming by a process of trial and error generalizations
that are merely useful tools by means of which we describe in
mental shorthand as wide a range of facts as possible. We
choose that form of description which works most simply in
enabling us to describe past observations or to protect future
observations. He points to a similar development in the field
of social sciences. For instance, economics has shifted from
the conception of the acquisitive man to experimental collection of facts. He urges a similar change in law. For example,
in an article on the breakdown of a narrow-minded doctrine of
the law of contracts, he begins by telling how generalizations
in physics have been found to need revision or amendment as
more events are observed or events previously noticed are reexamined with more delicate or powerful instruments.
The phenomena of legal science consist primarily of the
conduct of certain agents of society, judges, and similar officials. The records of their past conduct is found in law
reports. On the basis of these records and the scholar's
knowledge of the behavior patterns of the existing agents of
society-such as members of the Supreme Court of the United
States-and using a logical technique fundamentally similar
to that of other scientists, the legal scholar endeavors, Cook
says, to formulate general statements which will summarize
as accurately as possible these past phenomena and also serve
as an aid in forecasting future phenomena, that is, the future
decisions of whatever group of societal agents the scholar is
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interested in at the time. General statements of this kind are
what lawyers call law, or the rules of the existing law. Underlying them is an assumption of the uniformities of conduct on
the part of officials-the behavior patterns of judges causing
reactions to certain classes of stimuli (precedents) in a definite
way (following precedents). A lawyer must also from time
to time reformulate these rules to bring them into accord with
the totality of his observation just as Whitehead shows that
the rules as to the earth revolving around the sun, or vice
versa, have been revised in the light of new facts observed by
Ptolemy, Kepler, Galileo, and Einstein.
As in the physical sciences, they say that the limit of advance
in the social sciences will be set by the fruitfulness of the
ranges of phenomena selected for observation and by the
exactness with which such phenomena can be observed. This
empirical method should test legal postulates, but these need
to have some current significance. Little of such significance
attaches, they say, to great masses of the present postulates of
the law, which originated in medieaval scholasticism and have
been subjected to little testing since by observations or experimentation.
Without committing myself to any attempted fusion of
physical and social sciences, I want to emphasize the increasingly closer relation between law and the other social sciences.
The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences points out links
hitherto not generally realized, especially the introductory
first volume on the Development of Social Thought and Institutions, notably the closing chapter on War and Reorientation. Recent legal developments are paralleled by many of
the developments listed in other social sciences-the general
suspicion of thories, the attention to non-rational elements as
in Wallas's Human Nature in Politics, relativity and the interest in the individual or the single event as the term of
reference, the dissolution of a sense of personal responsibility
under the influence of psychoanalysis and behaviorism, the
tendency of anthropology to emphasize the uniqueness of
every concrete situation, regionalism in geography, etc., concentrating on all the social forces in a given area. The attack
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on judicial reasoning recalls debunking biographies. The
editors conclude that in law the genetic method shows an
amazing and devious carry-over of old ideas to deal with new
situations. No more fertile phase of intellectual history is to
be found in any of the social sciences than in law. One of the
oldest of organized studies is passing through a new, youthful
stage.
From these general discussions I turn to some recent investigations of the actual operation of legal rules. The first is
Alfred Bettman, Analysis of Criminal Surveys in his Report
on Prosecution in the first volume of the bound reports of the
Wickersham Commission. Here he explains the so-called
mortality tables first devised and applied in the Cleveland
survey in which Mr. Bettman was associated with Dean Pound
and Professor Frankfurter. The purpose of such a table is to
set up the statistics of the disposition of a large group of
arrested persons in such a way as to give a picture of the
number and percentage of cases which fall away or die at the
various stages between arrest and conviction, and thereby
throw some light on the relative responsibility of the various
organs of justice for the failure of many offenders to receive
adequate punishment. Before these tables were published, the
attention of the bar and the bench was concentrated on the
jury trial as supposedly the proper place for improvements in
the disposition of criminals. Much was said about the vital
need of selecting better juries, simplifying the rules of evidence, and eliminating long hypothetical questions to expert
witnesses. In contrast to this attitude, look at one of Mr.
Bettman's mortality tables. In Chicago, in 1926, 11,000
felonies (excluding liquor cases) were charged against that
number of arrested persons. Out of this 11,000 cases, 6,000
or much more than fifty per cent, were eliminated without even
going before the grand jury. Over 3,000 were released on
the responsibility of the prosecuting officers, and over 2,000
were discharged by the committing magistrate because no
sufficient evidence was presented against them. Out of 4,900
cases taken before the grand jury, 1,500 were eliminated
chiefly because no indictment was found. Of the remainder
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who entered the trial court, 1,600 more were released on the
responsibility of the prosecution; 2,000 more pleaded guilty
to the offense charged or a lesser offense and so never went
before the jury. Out of the original 11,000, 490 were convicted after trial and 580 were acquitted. Thus fewer than
1,100 prisoners, or ten per cent of the original group, ever
came before a jury. More were convicted by agreement with
the district attorney than by a jury. The number acquitted
was only a tenth of the number released on the responsibility
of the district attorney, and only a quarter of the number released by the committing magistrate at the preliminary hearing. Obviously the proper points for improvement are the
district attorney's office and the so-called inferior court to
which the prisoner is brought immediately after arrest.
Professor Sheldon Glueck, of Harvard, in his 500 Criminal
Careers,studied 510 men who left the Massachusetts Ref ormatory at Concord during the years 1911-22. He examines the
methods used in the reformatory, but the most important part
of his study comes after the men left its walls. Through
energetic and prolonged investigation, Mr. and Mrs. Glueck
ascertained what almost every one of these men did during
five years after discharge and tried to learn what effect they
showed and felt from the Reformatory. One striking fact
was that over three-fourths of these men committed crimes
during this five-year period. This is diametrically opposed to
the estimates in annual reports of reformatories and prisons
that eighty per cent of the inmates are "successes" after discharge. It looks as if reformatories do not reform. A similar investigation of 1,000 children passing through the Boston Juvenile Court under a judge of great wisdom reveals that
within five years after the close of official treatment eightyeight per cent committed crimes. This need not lead to hopelessness, but it proves that the problem is far more difficult
than anybody realized. The Gluecks' latest book, Five Hundred Delinquent lomen, indicates a higher success rate during the five-year period for the graduates of the Massachusetts
Reformatory for Women. The strongest cause of reform
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appeared to be a happy marriage and the responsibility of
bringing up children.
Some years ago Everson studied the sentences in the various
Magistrates Courts in New York City. Judge A found
ninety-seven per cent of his drunkenness cases guilty and Judge
B twenty-one per cent. Judge C discharged eighteen per cent
in disorderly conduct cases and Judge D fifty-four per cent.
Vagrancy discharges among the judges varied from five per
cent to seventy-nine per cent. Some judges fined a large proportion of their cases while others ran freely to suspended
sentences. The disclosures were "so startling and so disconcerting that it seemed advisable to discontinue the compara10 1. Grim. L. &
tive table of the records of justices."
Criminol. 90.
Civil remedies for automobile accidents were investigated
by a large group of lawyers and law teachers under the auspices of the Columbia University Council for Research in the
Social Sciences. Summary in 32 Col. L. Rev. 785 (1932).
Nearly 9,000 cases of actual injury to life or person were
studied, in cities of varying sizes and rural regions. Legal
theories were laid aside in an effort to find what actually happens after an accident. It was shown that the existing policy,
which contemplates adequate compensation based upon the
defendant's fault, is not carried out. Where this policy would
give compensation, recovery is often prevented by the expense,
delays, and risks of trial and still more by difficulties of
collection.
In conclusion, let me speak of my personal reactions to these
new ideas. In the Wickersham investigation I did all the
fact-finding I want to do in my life. At the same time I welcome the results of such work on the part of others who do
enjoy it and hope to check my own "Platonic" ideas thereby.
I admit that we have been too easily satisfied by the wording
of rules without troubling to learn how they affect human
lives. The discrepancies are too great to ignore. They loom
up in Herbert's Holy Deadlock and his Misleading Cases, for
instance, and the absurdity of treating slander more leniently
than libel when the spoken word goes out over the radio. The
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more they are studied the better. And in dealing with the
universals, Frank's despised rules, I find myself far less mathematical than twenty years ago, more tentative, more worried
about the imponderables. The unrational is all around me,
and I see that reason plays less part than I hoped. "For the
use of reason is to justify the obscure desires that moved our
conduct, impulses, prejudices, and follies, and also our fear."
Conrad, Victory.
Law has at least three meanings, (1) the behavior of
judges and officials, (2) a collection of rules, (3) a body of
ideals. Law is the will of the judges trying to do right within
the accepted rules of their action.
Although I am too old to change my faith in the predominant value of legal rules, I see no reason for wasting time in
bickerings with those whose ideas are different. "There is
more than enough room for all of us and more than enough
work." (Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1931).

